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Category Archives: Articles Published in English

Turkey’s Spy Agency provided with carte blanche for human rights abuses

15 Thursday May 2014

Posted by deryalawrence in Articles Published in English

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Freedom of Press, human rights, MIT, National Intelligence Agency, Turkey

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http://www.article19.org/join-the-debate.php/145/view/

On 17 April, the Turkish Parliament passed a law increasing the power and immunity of the National Intelligence Agency (MİT). The new law amends the previous law dating back to 1983, clearly aiming towards making the MİT more powerful and less accountable. In short, the law negatively impacts on freedom of press, decreases government accountability, increases the state’s capacity to monitor its citizens and makes MİT operatives immune from prosecution, regardless of any human rights abuse they might commit.

According to the new law, the Council of Ministers can authorise operational duties to the MİT on any issues related to external security, counter-terrorism and national security.  Turkey has a track record of using broad and vague language to silence critical news and opinion and allow the state “interpretation” of the law. It is therefore not unsurprising, but troubling that the definition of “national security” is vague and unclear, permitting the MIT to carry out operations against anyone that the government deems a “national security threat”. Given how polarised Turkish society is, any group that opposes the government could easily become the target of MIT operations.

Under the new law, the activities of the MIT are kept completely secret from the public. Journalists and editors who dare to publish leaked intelligence documents, or provide information on national intelligence activities or personnel face maximum sentences of a staggering ten years in jail. Issues relating to “national security”, and in fact any issues the government claims to be related to national security, are effectively barred from public debate and closed off from public scrutiny. The public is effectively prevented from holding the government and its institutions accountable.

The MİT is also permitted to demand and collect private data from all public institutions, all legal entities, as well as institutions without a legal personality. This particular aspect of the law undermines the individual right to privacy, and also makes the MİT unaccountable as it is able to access data without requiring a court order.

Another implication of the law is that if a person is seen to prevent the MİT from carrying out its duties and exercising its authority, they could be liable to a prison sentence of two to five years. As the MİT is allowed access to confidential data, refusing to provide the MİT with information could be interpreted as interfering in their work, leading to imprisonment.

The law gives MİT operatives immunity, even if they have violated fundamental human rights – e.g. for example the right not to be subjected to torture – in the course of their duties.  As a consequence, MİT personnel are not accountable to public prosecutors, and public courts are not permitted to investigate claims of offence. The MİT is placed above the law.

These developments are particularly worrying given the current political climate. Over the past year, the AKP government has proven hostile in the face of criticism and has progressively implemented laws increasing its power over different branches of state. The result has been the gradual erosion of the rule of law and the principle of a separation of powers. In this respect, the new MİT law is a threat to Turkey’s ability to effectively protect human rights and is likely to deal a serious blow to its human rights record.

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The curtain finally rises: PM Erdoğan announces the long awaited ‘Democracy Package’

03 Thursday Oct 2013

Posted by deryalawrence in Articles Published in English

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AKP, Alevi, Democracy Package, Kurdish, Trukey


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DERYA LAWRENCE 3 October 2013

erdogan

The package contains important but limited improvements. What it leaves out, however, may be its most significant feature, alongside the presentation.

In a press statement made on September 30, PM Erdoğan disclosed the long awaited package of reforms addressing democratic concerns. Discussions on which areas of democratic governance would be strengthened via the package and which issues might be left out has occupied the domestic agenda for quite some time.

To facilitate meaningful democratic reforms that allow for democratic reflexes to grow roots, it is not enough to amend a bunch of laws that are current practise in democratic governance. Internalising its underlying ethos is as important as the formal changes.

Unfortunately, reading between the lines and contextualising issues that are included/excluded, the timing of the package, and the way in which the package was drafted and launched highlights once again that although ‘deepening democracy’ has always been an important part of the AKP’s pragmatist political campaign, the AKP’s paternal instincts and its fondness for authoritarian governance remain as strong as ever.

Who is the democratic package intended for?

In general, the proposed amendments show that the guiding mindset in the writing of the package has been preoccupied with the Kurdish Peace Process. To bring readers up to date, in the last round of peace talks between the government and the PKK (March 21), the action plan was drafted as a ‘three tier process’.

In the first instance, the PKK were expected to withdraw from Turkish territories. Secondly, a process of democratisation where the Turkish state would concede much required fundamental rights and freedoms vis-a-vis the nation’s Kurdish population would be implemented via legal amendments. The third and final step would be a normalisation of relations.

Recently, the peace talks were branded as a dead end street due to frustrations on both sides. While the government criticised the PKK for not sticking to its end of the bargain, PKK withdrawal brought things to a halt on September 9 on the basis that the government was dragging its feet in implementing democratic reforms. The agreed deadline for the reform package was indeed September 1. The construction and fortification of military outposts in hostile eastern provinces in June was another issue that the PKK saw as a betrayal on the part of the government.

Hence, the package announced on Monday is primarily an attempt to pull back on track a derailed peace process and a statement on the part of the government that it is committed to the peace accords.

Furthermore, the protests that raged throughout the summer months across Turkey – reports state that protests were held in 79 cities out of 81 – were embraced by a multitude of identities encapsulating Alevis, Anti-Capitalist Muslims, Armenians, Kurds, Nationalists, Seculars and LGBT activists alike, with the overarching demand of more democracy and more freedom. As such, this democratic package should also be seen as a response to the demands of the Gezi Movement. In short, the unveiling of this democratic package was unavoidable on both counts: prolonging its announcement any longer would have amounted to political suicide.

General reception, benefits and shortcomings

Undoubtedly, there will be those who find the package satisfactory. Deputy PM Bülent Arınç is of the opinion that ‘75%’ of the population is satisfied. It must also be stated that any expansion of democratic avenues is a beneficial development and there are many provisions in the package that expand on democratic governance in areas of political rights and fundamental rights and freedoms.

The amendment that lifts the ban on headscarves in all public institutions apart for the army, police and judiciary is a positive democratic reform. The creation of a cultural institute and language courses for Roma Communities is a very progressive step, even if it is only a beginning. The re-instatement of the Mor Gabriel Monastery to the Assyrian Community is another example of a positive step taken to safeguard the human rights of minorities.

However, the BDP (Kurdish political party) have already stated that the democracy package is inadequate in terms of the expansion of rights and freedoms for Kurds. As far as they are concerned, the proposed changes are mere breadcrumbs and don’t tackle root problems.

Education in the mother tongue, reduced to private schools only, is not a large enough step forward, given that the AKP had already allowed for private language schools to teach Kurdish through legal amendments in 2002.

More importantly, although part of the package allows villages, though not districts or provinces, to   be re-named with their Kurdish names, and Kurds will be able to procure ID cards with more accurate spelling of their proper names, the ongoing insistence on a highly centralised political system turns a deaf ear to Kurdish demands for local governance. Essentially the centralist, controlling mindset of Turkish rule remains intact. And of course the largest shortcoming for the Kurdish cause has been the lack of reform of a Turkish Penal Code that has put thousands of Kurdish activists behind bars (the KCK trials).

Similarly, through discussions on social network sites, it would appear that the sections of Turkish society who were active during the Gezi Demonstrations and who have also been calling for an expansion of individual rights and freedom, are equally dissatisfied.

During his long preamble, Erdoğan states that “The attitude that turns a deaf ear to the needs, demands and cries of citizens, but which absorbs them without trace is gone. There is no longer a government that exerts authority in public, or one that turns public spaces into a living hell against citizens who don’t act according the government’s definition of correctness”. This statement could also be turned on its head to describe the reception of some of the AKP’s conservative policies among the public eg. issues around alcohol restrictions and abortion rights – key provocations behind the recent waves of protests.

The package includes only a miniscule amendment to the law that regulates freedom of assembly and an extra hour for protests if and when permission for the protest has been granted in the first place…

At face value, the provisions that strengthen the protection of individual life-styles and discrimination from hate speech are also positive but they contain hidden dangers. Hate speech should never be allowed, but if the amendment is used as a legal platform to punish undesired criticisms, then freedom of expression will suffer even more. I highlight this as a danger because recently, there have been a number of cases where individuals have been persecuted for hate speech under the rubric of desecrating religious values. On the other hand, life-styles that are deemed ‘inappropriate’ by individuals with hardline religious beliefs are openly discussed as such on state channels and private channels alike, without triggering a response from the courts. In particular there was no mention of hate speech and crimes against members of the LGBT community.

One of the largest shortcomings of the package is in relation to a lack of provisions that relate to the demands of the Alevi (Shiite) community towards claiming the same rights as other citizens. The Alevis demand the right to have their spaces of prayer (Cemevi) officially recognised. They also reject compulsory courses on religion (exclusively Sunni), administered by the exclusively Sunni Directorate of Religious Affairs. There was no movement on any of these points. The only amendment in relation to the Alevi Community was the thoroughly cosmetic change in the name of one University, this after all the bragging about naming the third bridge in Istanbul after an ancestor who massacred Alevis.

There are a very lengthy list of issues that were not included in this ‘democracy package’. To mention just a few of the most pressing concerns voiced in recent days;

–  The issue of the ‘Special Authority Courts’ was ignored.

–  No amnesty was given to political prisoners that include political activists, journalists and MPs and long detention periods were not responded to.

–  Obstacles to the democratisation of politics inherent in the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law or the Law on Police Duties and Powers were not addressed.

–  Limitations placed on local governance mechanisms which are part of international accords were not lifted.

–  Although the Assyrian Church reclaimed the Mor Gabrial Monastery, the Ecumenical Orthodox Church and the Halki Seminary were left out.

Democracy designed behind closed doors

PM Erdoğan’s press conference intended to unveil this democracy package lasted 67 minutes, of which 44 were targeted against the opposition party, the ‘non-democrats’ and any potential future criticisms against the package.

Not only were journalists not allowed to ask questions, but journalists who the government sees as critical to its party were not even invited. This in its own way is as important an indicator to the true health of democracy in Turkey: the presentation of the package is as important as the contents.

The message one gets is that however much Turkey democratises, the choice of areas selected for democratisation is at the mercy of Prime Minister Erdoğan. After all, another criticism levelled against the preparation of the package was the lack of consultation with different parts of society, which received a dismissal en passant from Erdoğan – pre-emptively – who said during his speech that from, “ those afraid of change, innovation and high standards” he only expected “denigration along the lines of the ‘mountain having given birth to a molehill’”. The PM also made it clear that he wasn’t seeking the backing of the opposition. On the contrary, he once again deliberately placed the CHP in the crosshairs.

In short, the package falls short of addressing the central demands of the Kurds and Alevis and is therefore unlikely to reduce tensions and create the conditions for societal peace. Similarly, by not tackling the underlying illiberal and undemocratic governance traditions, those who have been demonstrating against the government with clear and explicit demands, are not likely to be impressed either.

Not all is bad though. I think it is important not to underestimate the fact that this is the first time a reform package has been published without the pressure of outside forces. The meaning and significance of this is great because it throws the spotlight on a deep-rooted societal demand for democratic reform which is not going to go away.

Where Turkish politics meets football: AKP’s offside goal against ‘Çarşı’

29 Sunday Sep 2013

Posted by deryalawrence in Articles Published in English

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football, openDemocracy, pitch invasion, Turkey


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DERYA LAWRENCE 28 September 2013

The derby match between Besiktas and Galatasaray that was played in Istanbul was abandoned at the 90+2nd minute after an eruption of violence resulted in a pitch invasion. Foreign papers and local news reports alike have concentrated their coverage on the presence of violence without really probing the consequences or the underlying reasons why this event took place in the first place. Conveniently, we have also stopped questioning issues surrounding the AKP’s recent conduct or the ‘democracy package’ that the AKP have been promising to announce for the past 3 weeks.

Right after the game, the social media – including comments from AKP deputies and associates -was riddled with attacks against ‘ÇARŞI’, the fan group of the Beşiktaş football club. Thus, it is evident that ÇARŞI are being painted as the culprits of the pitch invasion and violence of the Sunday game. However, since Beşiktaş will now be banned from having supporters present at its games, the ‘losing side’ of the incident is also ÇARŞI and the wider Beşiktaş fan base, a clear contradiction in terms.

To highlight the inadequacies in this account of events, that a bunch of Beşiktaş supporters got frustrated by a player being booked and raided the pitch, you have to appreciate something of the climate in which the football season has kicked off, and in particular, ÇARŞI’s centrality in the protest movement against the AKP throughout the summer months in Turkey.

The recent politicisation of sports in Turkey

In the post-Gezi Park occupation climate, Turkey has truly become a police state. Independent of any argument for or against the need for a police presence and their conduct, their sheer presence and encroachment on daily life in urban Istanbul is a simple fact of life. There are tens of police vans and thousands of riot police stationed 24/7 in central locations around Istanbul. Moreover, they conduct bag searches at will and end up tear gassing up and down residential neighborhoods more often than not.

PM Erdoğan had announced that a series of measures would be taken to prevent stadiums and university campuses from becoming major protest venues as the football season and the academic year was about to begin. In relation to politics and sport, a series of statements were made that announced measures such as; the outlawing of political chants at stadiums; the replacement of private security officers with policemen; breathalyser testing; profiling etc..

Following the crackdown on Gezi Park and the dispersal of demonstrators, as a public space where citizens congregate, football stadiums have indeed become spaces where citizens voiced their support for the Gezi demonstrations and their protest against the AKP regime. The chant “Everywhere is Taksim, everywhere is resistance” was echoed in all first week Turkish league fixtures in late August. To a lesser degree, these chants are still ongoing.

I say to a lesser degree because prior to the start of the season, the Interior Minister warned that politically motivated chants were illegal at football games, giving an indication as to what those bold enough to raise their voices in opposition to the AKP publicly could expect. At another point, in the context of politically motivated chants at stadiums, the Minister of Sports stated that Turkey had been combating terrorism for 30 odd years and that they would not shy away now. These examples go to show the government’s preference for using the stick and treating its own frustrated citizens as terrorists. Very fitting when considering all along the issue has been a lack of democratic governance.

The conservative clampdown of the AKP with regards to alcohol restrictions were also initiated in September, including breathalyser tests at football stadiums that result in the barring of supporters who are ‘found guilty’ of being over the alcohol limit. A new electronic ticketing system has also been introduced at stadiums which involves the monitoring and profiling of football fans. In sum, football has been a pain to watch (live and on screen) with the ridiculous number of police present at all matches since the beginning of the 2013-2014 league and all the invasive measures taken to ‘depoliticise’ football.

Most games have created some sort of newsworthy headline one way or another. Either through LigTV’s – the TV provider of the Turkish League – complicit support of the AKP government by muting the voice of fans at the stadium chanting against the government, or through reports that highlight the tension amongst supporters that were in support/opposition of the AKP.

All in all, the AKP are indeed to blame for bringing politics into football through measures that they  have taken to profile supporters, crack down on the opposition and marginalise opposition groups. This latest incident at the derby game and the scapegoating of ÇARŞI is precisely an attempt at punishing a body that has been vocal against the AKP. 

ÇARŞI and the derby game 

The Beşiktaş’s supporter group ‘ÇARŞI’ was one of the most vocal bodies to have stood up in support of the Gezi protests and the whole movement against the AKP from the beginning. Needless to say, the authorities have been eager to contain ÇARŞI. This was already highlighted through the arrest of numerous ÇARŞI members in the very first waves when the ‘mastermind’ culprits behind the Gezi movement were being ‘unearthed’ in the witch-hunt that started in June.

I wasn’t at the football game on Sunday. I wasn’t even in Istanbul. However, testimonies from people who were at the stadium and reports from the media highlight very clearly the unique conditions at the game on Sunday. Although security at stadiums have been upped due to a general increase in police presence at public places, only 500 policemen and 1500 private security guards were commissioned for the derby game. In the run up to the game, newspapers reported on a national record high attendance for the game where over 77,000 tickets were sold.

In comparison, at another derby on August 18 between Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe (played in Kayseri), 2000 policemen and 1000 security officers were commissioned. I’m not trying to defend high levels of police at stadiums as the way to tackle any problem, but I do find it puzzling that the authorities would commission less police for a vastly larger crowd which has been known to be the most vocal critic of the government.

Moreover, whereas the police had taken over the responsibility for physical searches and screenings for football fans entering the stadium in the afore-mentioned derby game in mid-August, searches for the derby on Sunday were lax to say the least. Many first hand accounts mention the surprising lack of any real body searches that have accompanied other league games this season.

Then there was the recent creation of an alternative Beşiktaş supporter group called ‘1453’ (the year Istanbul was conquered – very neo-Ottoman). Mehmet Baransu from Taraf Newspaper elaborates on traces on the internet that highlight links between AKP’s youth organisations and this new 1453 Beşiktaş group. Moreover, on his Facebook page, one of the AKP’s youth leaders is careless enough to boast how he got free tickets for the game and was personally one of the first to invade the pitch.

So what does this all mean? 

On the one hand, a police force that has been extensively used at sports events were withdrawn or ‘under-represented’ for the most packed game in Turkish football history. On the other, free tickets were given to members of an alternative Beşiktaş supporter group that was formed in opposition specifically in relation to ÇARŞI’s Anti-AKP stance. This group was seated right in front of the pitch and were one of the first groups onto the pitch.

What is most important is the apparent link between the AKP and ‘1453’, which suggests that the AKP had a hand in attempts at placing a wedge amongst Beşiktaş supporters. Regardless of ‘1453’, ÇARŞI or any organised group, a football game where over 80,000 people were present was cancelled because there was an invasion of the pitch by men hurling plastic seats and wielding lethal weapons. (Add to the mix the fact that local elections are coming up and that the campaign is well under way with transportation promotion adverts on every billboard)

Beşiktaş will now be banned from playing in front of its supporters, meaning no more anti-AKP chants. As far as the AKP are concerned, this is a positive outcome. There is an upcoming fixture where Beşiktaş play Rize Spor in Erdoğan’s hometown. Then there is of course the Istanbul games in Kasımpaşa. Whichever way you look at it , this looks like bending the rules of the game to say the least, and it may still have to be counted as an ‘offside goal’.

Ismail Er’s Facebook messages:

Ismail Er tweets

ismail er

The screenshot taken from a dialogue on Facebook between Ismail Er, his brother Murat Er and a third person (Caner Çelik) confirms the claims that the Beşiktaş group called ‘1453’ were behind the pitch invasion and that Ismail Er was part of the first group that ignited the pitch invasion.
The dialogue reads as follows:
“Caner Celik: Did you go onto the pitch as well Ismail?”
“Ismail Er: Yes I did brother but I left soon after. Either way it was our stand that went onto the pitch first”
“Murat Er: Our 1453 lads hit the pitch strong. Çarşı didn’t understand what hit them. Now we are on the scene :))”
“Ismail Er: Exactly brother”.
The second screenshot has a profile photograph taken from the AKP’s website that shows Ismail Er as the AKP’s Küçükçekmece (in Istanbul) district youth organisation president. Moreover, a photo taken in front of an AKP campaigning bus confirms his affiliation. Through statements made on Facebook, Ismail Er states that he got the match tickets for free (they were handed out to him) and that he invaded the pitch with a weapon.
The underlined texts are  involuntary confessions made by Ismail Er as to his involvement in the pitch invasion. The texts read as follows;
“Ismail Er: I went onto the pitch with Donner Kebab blades”
“Ismail Er: The tickets were free, what could we do”
Whereas the first facebook correspondence confirms the involvement of ‘1453’ group members in the pitch invasion, the second correspondences and Ismail Er’s credentials highlight an apparent link between the AKP and 1453. The fact that an AKP youth leader is in posession of free tickets to a game and is one of the first people to invade the pitch are the strongest indicators

Lesson learnt from the Sivas Massacre?

13 Saturday Jul 2013

Posted by deryalawrence in Articles Published in English

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AKP, Justice, Madımak, Sivas Massacre

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DERYA LAWRENCE 5 July 2013

 

July 2, 2013, was the twentieth anniversary of the Sivas Massacre, known in Turkey as the ‘Madımak Massacre”. In 1993, thirty-seven distinguished individuals who were writers, poets and thinkers – most of whom were Alevi – and 2 hotel personnel were murdered by a mob of Islamic extremists when the hotel was set on fire. This event is carved into Turkish collective memory as being one of the primary brutal attacks on free speech and human rights in Turkey’s recent history.

Procedural problems during the trials

The legal hearings started in 1993 and the final verdict was given in 2001. Under charges of “attempting to establish a religious state by changing the constitutional order”, 33 were sentenced to death and another 91 were handed varying prison sentences. The death sentences were later converted to life imprisonment due to changes in the law. But as early as 2004, following exoneration and discharges, the number of imprisoned defendants was down to 33.

Cafer Erçakmak, a member of Sivas City Council at that time, was one of the key figures in the investigation. He and seven others managed to escape in 1997 when the Court of Appeals reversed the verdict. Later, it became clear that Erçakmak had married in Sivas on the 27 July 1999, gone on military service on the 22 May 1997, and even applied to the police for a driver’s license.

Either way, the ‘search’ for these individuals was only finalised on 13 March 2012 when the courts decreed that the Madımak Trials had lapsed due to time and declared a statute of limitations. That day, Erdoğan stated, “May this bring good fortune”. The next day, protesters who were outraged at the verdict were tear gassed and dispersed.

AKP’s response to Madımak

Returning to the present, whilst protesters were staking their claims on the streets in major cities throughout June, Prime Minister Erdoğan went around the country holding “Respect for the National Will” rallies. On June 23 in Erzurum, Erdoğan apologised to the Alevi community for the Sivas massacre. Or rather, he made the point that whereas the CHP were in charge at the time, he was still apologising for their wrongdoings. That same day, Alevis in Istanbul were protesting for freedom of speech and their human rights.

Under the surface rhetoric of which Erdoğan is a master, the AKP as a political body does not act like a party that has learnt the lessons of Madımak, or that truly understands the predispositions of the minorities that it claims to protect. On July 1, Sezgin Tanrıkulu, an MP from the CHP put forward notice of a motion to lift the ‘statute of limitation’ when it comes to cases of felonious homicide, torture and child rape. The motion was rejected because voted down by the AKP.

Besides, a large number of lawyers that were attorneys to the defendants of the Madımak Massacre are a part of the AKP’s upper hierarchy: eight are MPs and many are within local politics, not to mention those who went on holding esteemed positions on judicial boards. It isn’t wrong per se for lawyers to defend clients on trial for heinous acts. But the high concentration of such figures within AKP ranks or high-up in parallel tracks points to a structural problem.

After all, Madımak is not just another trial. The rift that this politically fuelled massacre opened between the religious and secular segments of society, and the reluctant attitude of the government to conduct a proper investigation, are part and parcel of the same structural problem. Thus, the close proximity between the lawyers of the defendants and the AKP understandably leads many to question the AKP’s sincerity.

Lessons learnt?

It is not only the symbolic importance of Madımak, but also the motives behind the massacre that require us to learn lessons from the tragedy. The potential for tension rising between the ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ of Turkey in the wake of the Gezi protests is worth bearing in mind. From this perspective, neither Erdoğan nor the AKP has learnt the necessary lesson.

Every other statement made by Erdoğan incessantly depicts the protesting ‘terrorists’/‘looters’ as disrespectful of religious values. His false attack on the protesters for “drinking in the Mosque” which started on 3 June 2013 is one such example. The müezzin of the mosque in question countered Erdoğan’s statements on two occasions. Once before he was ‘relieved’ of his duty at the mosque, and once after. Other statements by Erdoğan such as , “if there are thousands on the streets, we have a 50% that we are holding back” or attempts to generally undermine the protests through campaigning around the clock to get as many AKP supporters to his rallies are actions that can only polarise the population.

As was the case with the LGBT parade on the 30th June, or the large scale protests that took place in western Turkey over a Kurdish protest incident all the way in the east (Lice), the momentum of the Gezi spirit has resulted in strong support for all issues and causes that relate to advocacy of basic rights and freedoms.

In the case of commemorating Madımak, a 10,000 strong crowd marched along the streets of Kadıköy (Anatolian side of Istanbul) chanting, “we will not forget Madımak, we will not let you forget Madımak”. The inhabitants of Kadıköy have been explicitly supportive of the protests and shown this once again by joining in the march from their balconies by clapping/ making noise as the convoy went past. Once the march was concluded, the crowd moved on to the nearby forum (Yoğrutçu Park) for the daily discussion. Smaller protests were organised in Sivas, Ankara, İzmir, Eskişehir, Urfa and Tunceli.

The main item on the agenda in the ‘agora style’ park forums over the last days has undoubtedly been Madımak. The forums have served as the rally point for marches that move onto central squares across the nation. Many identities walked side by side to commemorate Madımak. Confrontational statements that have become the AKP’s way of doing politics (both in terms of voters and parties) will only exacerbate the rift that is widening between all minorities, seculars, leftists and nationalists on the one side, and the partisan supporters of the AKP on the other.

Recent Posts

  • Turkey’s Spy Agency provided with carte blanche for human rights abuses
  • Turkish Municipal Elections fall prey to electoral fraud
  • Are the walls closing in on Erdoğan? (Taped conversation between PM and his son)
  • Coercion, Surveillance, Censorship: Brace yourselves for the new Internet Law!
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